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QUILL HAS BEEN PLUCKED!
MTC STATES ARE SLOWLY ERODING
THE SUBSTANTIAL NEXUS STANDARD
JOHN C. BLASE AND JOHN W. WESTMORELAND*
I. INTRODUCTION
Sales and use taxes are imposed on the sales of tangible personal
property and certain services within a taxing state.l The use tax is a
corollary to a state's sales tax and is typically imposed on the right to
use, store, or consume tangible personal property in the taxing state, but
only to the extent that sales tax has not been paid on such property. 2
Additionally, the use tax is normally self-assessed (i.e., voluntarily paid
to the state by the purchaser), and the purchaser is primarily responsible
for paying the tax.3 However, when an out-of-state seller makes ship-
ments to an in-state purchaser, the seller may be responsible by law to
collect the state use tax if the out-of-state seller has some physical
connection, or "nexus," with that state.
This article will focus specifically on use taxes, addressing issues
concerning the out-of-state seller's legal obligation for collecting the use
tax from the in-state customer. The power of the states to require
out-of-state sellers to collect their use taxes is derived from nexus
standards created under both the Due Process and Commerce Clauses of
the United States Constitution. 4 In Quill v. North Dakota,5 the Supreme
* John C. Blase, Esq., CPA, a senior manager in the St. Louis office of Ernst & Young LLP,
received his J.D. degree from the University of Notre Dame in 1990. John W. Westmoreland, a tax
consultant in the St. Louis office of Ernst & Young LLP, received his J.D. and M.Acc. degrees from
the University of Missouri-Columbia in December 1997.
I. JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, SALES AND USE, PERSONAL INCOME, AND
DEATH AND GIFT TAXES 12.03 (1992).
2. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, 16.03, at 16-3 to 16-29 (describing the use
tax statutes in the states and examples of specific uses which may create liability); JOHN F. DUE & JOHN
J. MIKESELL, SALES TAX'N, STATE AND LOCAL STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION 247-48 (2d ed. 1995)
(discussing the legal nature of use taxes and the basis of liability under use tax statutes).
3. To accomplish the objective of limiting retail sales taxes and use taxes to purchases by the
ultimate consumer, sales to wholesalers or retailers or others who resell the goods they purchase are
excluded from tax as "sales for resale," or as "wholesale" sales as distinguished from "retail" sales.
Similarly, the statutes often exempt from tax certain items purchased for use in manufacturing,
fabricating, or processing personal property for sale if the items become an ingredient or component
part of the product that is to be sold. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-39.2-01.7 (1993 & Supp. 1997).
4. See infra notes 83-155 and accompanying text.
5. 504 U.S. 298 (1992). Quill has been one of the most important cases of the Supreme Court in
the area of sales and use taxes; a number of law review articles and notes have tried to explain its
import. These articles and notes include: Anna M. Hoti, Finishing What Quill Started: The Trans-
actional Nexus Test For State Use Tax Collection, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1449 (1996); James L. Kronenberg,
A New Commerce Clause Nexus Requirement: The Analysis of Nexus in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,
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Court defined the boundaries of both the Due Process and Commerce
Clause nexus requirements. However, in relation to Commerce Clause
nexus, as Justice White foresaw in his acclaimed partial dissent, the
majority opinion's so-called "bright-line" standard for finding a nexus
has since spurred much controversy over what types of activities
attributed to an out-of-state company constitute "physical presence" in
a given state.6
In the six years since Quill, several jurisdictions have substantially
increased their efforts to assert that nexus exists between out-of-state ven-
dors and the taxing state. Recently, many states have asserted nexus in
situations based solely on the presence and activities of third-party repre-
sentatives who perform services within the taxing state on behalf of these
out-of-state vendors, even where these activities involve something other
than the solicitation of sales. In contending that the activities of their
"non-sales" representatives (for example, warranty repair companies)
do not, in and of themselves, cause them to establish a substantial nexus
with the taxing state, vendors have generally responded that the recent
audit aggression by states flies in the face of Quill and the constitutional
limitations expressed therein. Member states of the Multistate Tax Com-
mission (MTC)7 believe, however, that sufficient constitutional authority
exists for them to assert jurisdiction over these out-of-state vendors. 8
1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1 (1994); Michael C. Hamersley, Note, Will The Bellas Hess Physical
Presence Requirement Continue To Protect Out-Of-State Mail-Order Retailers From State Use Taxes
In The Quill Era? Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 46 TAX LAW. 515 (1993); Shane D. Buntrock, Note,
Quill Corporation v. North Dakota: Spawning The Physical Presence "Nexus" Requirement Under
The Commerce Clause, 38 S.D. L. REV. 130 (1993); Pamela M. Krill, Note, Quill Corp. V. North
Dakota: Tax Nexus Under the Due Process and Commerce Clauses No Longer The Same, 1993 WIs.
L. REV. 1405 (1993); W. Carl Spinning, Note, Forcing Mail-Order Houses To Collect Use Taxes In The
Wake Of Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 60 TENN. L. REV. 1021 (1993); Stewart L. Mandell, Note, Quill
Clears The Way For Future State Tax'n Of Interstate Sales, 71 MICH. B.J. 946 (1992); and John
Thomas Below, Comment, Out-Of-State Catalog Sales And Constitutional Limitations On State Tax'n:
Reverse Protectionism And The Quill Corp. v. North Dakota Decision, 70 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 67
(1992).
Several articles in trade journals have also attempted to explain the meaning of Quill. Some of
the most important articles are: Todd Feldbruegge, Direct Mail Companies (A Use Tax Controversy, J.
ST. TAX'N, Mar. 1995; Rita Marie Cain, Mail Order Tax'n in the Post-Quill Era, J. ST. TAX'N, May
1994; and Rose Litvack & Joseph Guardino, Is Physical Presence Within the State Required?, J. ST.
TAX'N, Jan. 1994.
6. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 330-31 (1992) (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice White stated:
In my view, the question of Quill's actual physical presence is sufficiently close to cast
doubt on the majority's confidence that it is propounding a truly 'bright-line' rule.
Reasonable minds surely can, and will, differ over what showing is required to make out
a 'physical presence' adequate to justify imposing responsibilities for use tax collection.
And given the estimated loss in revenue to States of more than $3.2 billion this year alone
... it is a sure bet that the vagaries of 'physical presence' will be tested to their fullest in
our courts.
Id.
7. See infra notes 59, 61, 64, 66, and accompanying text.
8. MULTISTATE TAX COMM'N, NATIONAL NEXUS PROGRAM BULLETIN No. 95-1, COMPUTER
COMPANY'S PROVISION OF IN-STATE REPAIR SERVICES CREATES NEXUS (Dec. 20, 1995) [hereinafter
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As MTC affiliated states are continually faced with revenue
shortages, certain vendors should expect a flurry of sales and use tax
nexus audits that will focus on the vendors' usage of third-party service
companies. Because of the potential for tremendous liabilities, interest,
or penalties for past taxes uncollected from their customers, as well as
potential competitive disadvantages for having to collect such taxes
prospectively, these out-of-state vendors must be prepared to address the
pertinent issues related to nexus with state (and MTC) auditors as each
nexus audit commences.
II. USE TAXATION BY THE STATES: AN OVERVIEW AND
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
In recent years, as described above, states have become more aggres-
sive in their collection of use taxes from businesses. Because of a
shortage of taxpayer compliance and ever-changing commerce clause
nexus standards, use taxes have become a particularly good vehicle for
increasing a state's revenue base.
A. THE FUNCTION OF USE TAXES
Use taxes are excise taxes which, as stated above, are normally
imposed for the privilege of possessing, storing, or consuming goods in
BULLETIN 95-1]. Initially adopted by 26 states, BULLETIN 95-1 was publicly released as an
"information flyer" to advise taxpayers of the states' views of current constitutional law. However,
BULLETIN 95- I appears to expand the borders of current law. The following states have indicated that
their sales and use tax law is consistent with BULLETIN 95-1, the standards of which they will enforce:
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Washington. In 1996, the California State Board of Equalization
(SBE) and Franchise Tax Board (FTB) rescinded their previous adoption of BULLETIN 95-1.
The Multistate Tax Commission (MTC) gives the following example of when BULLETIN 95-1
applies:
An out-of-state direct marketing computer company ("Computer Co.") solicits sales
through advertising in computer magazines, catalogues, and fliers mailed into the taxing
State. Computer Co.'s one year warranty provides for repair services in the customer's
state. The Computer Co. proclaims to its customers and/or potential customers in the
taxing State through advertisements and other means that its warranty covers provision of
repair services in the customer's State. The warranty is either included with the
purchase of every Computer Co. computer or computer related equipment or is available
at an additional fee. Computer Co. sells a computer or related equipment to a customer
and end user in the taxing State. When the customer discovers a problem, the terms of
the warranty provide that the customer should contact Computer Co. to arrange repair
service. The customer is not authorized to call the third-party repair company to arrange
for the repair without first calling Computer Co. for authorization. Customer calls
Computer Co. which, after determining that the problem is covered by the warranty, may
first attempt to solve the problem over the telephone. The Computer Co. determines
whether repair is necessary and authorizes the in-state repair. Either Computer Co. or
the customer, on Computer Co.'s authorization, contacts a third-party service provider
who performs the service in the taxing State either at the customer's location or at a site
determined by the third-party service provider.
id. at 1-2.
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the state. The tax is sometimes referred to as a compensating use tax.
The use tax is collected on items bought from a location in another state,
but used in the taxing state.9 The tax is complementary to a state's sales
tax, which is imposed on the purchase of items from a point within a
taxing state.10
The use tax serves several functions. The primary purpose, of
course, is to raise revenue. I I Taxing states also want to prevent taxpayer
avoidance of a state sales tax. 12 For example, in the absence of the use
tax, abuse could occur if a consumer routinely purchased goods in a
state that does not impose a sales tax, with the mens rea of exporting
those goods immediately for ultimate use in another taxing state. A
third purpose for the use tax is to make an equitable adjustment between
local and interstate businesses. 13 If a local vendor must collect a sales
tax, while an out-of-state vendor escapes the tax collection responsibility,
then the local vendor will be at a competitive disadvantage because it will
be forced to charge a higher total price for the same items.
The use tax is generally levied upon purchases made from vendors
located in other states when the purchaser requests that the goods be
shipped to its place of business within the taxing state. Typically, the
taxation of a sale of tangible personal property depends on its
destination.14 Accordingly, sales taxes are imposed on goods which are
purchased for destination within the same state as the seller's place of
business. 15 Since sales taxes are often imposed under this destination
principle, purchasers usually are excused from the sales tax if they reside
in another state and request the seller to deliver the goods to that state. 16
Absent a use tax, such purchases would escape sales taxation in both the
state of purchase and the state of destination.17 The use tax was designed
9. Twenty-three states impose use tax liability on goods "purchased for use" within the state:
Illinois, Alabama, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Michi-
gan, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming. DUE & MIKESELL, supra note 2, at 247-48.
Other states apply the use tax to "any goods brought into the state for use, consumption, or storage in
the state and thus regardless of whether or not they were originally bought for use in the state":
Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, New York,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington, and Wisconsin. See id. at 248.
10. PAUL J. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATION ON STATE AND LOCAL TAX'N 10:1, at 579 (1981).
1I. See Paul J. Hartman, Collection of the Use Tax on Out-of-State Mail Order Sales, 39 VAND. L.
REV. 993, 994 (1986).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See HARTMAN, supra note 10,110:l, at 579.
15. Id.
16. Id. The sales tax will apply, however, where the out-of-state purchaser takes title and
possession of the goods in the state of origin and transports the goods back to its home state.
17. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, No. SR-12, LOCAL REVENUE
DIVERSIFICATION, LOCAL SALES TAXES 33 (1989) [hereinafter LOCAL REVENUE DIVERSIFICATION].
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to circumvent this occurrence and to provide a deterrent for in-state
companies purchasing goods in border states or by mail order just to
avoid the state's sales tax.' 8
B. USE TAX HISTORY
In 1932, Mississippi was the only state in the union to impose a sales
tax.' 9 The tax produced seven million dollars in revenue, less than one
percent of the state's total tax revenues. 20 Later in the 1930s, the use tax
emerged to close a sales tax loophole that was present in the taxation of
interstate sales. 21
The use tax was primarily developed by states to deal with pur-
chases made in neighboring states. The validity of the use tax was
upheld in 1937 in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.22 Early Supreme Court
decisions also held that a state's use tax may constitutionally have a
fairly broad reach over interstate sales. For example, in Felt and Tarrant
Manufacturing Co. v. Gallagher,23 third-party agents working out of a
company office in the taxing state constituted a nexus sufficient to
require collecting and remitting the use tax. 24
The first case which addressed use tax imposed upon a mail-order
seller was Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck25 in 1941. In that case, the Court
established that sellers with retail outlets in a state were required to collect
and remit use taxes on mail order sales delivered into the state by
common carrier rather than through the retail outlet.2 6 The Court based
its decision on the Commerce Clause.2 7
After the Supreme Court upheld the Washington use tax in 1937,
other states gradually passed their own use tax statutes. Since the early
1960s, all states imposing sales taxes have also imposed a use tax.28 The
states view the use tax as a means to protect their revenue bases and local
businesses. 29 Local governments have also begun imposing use taxes as
18. Id.
19. Jerome R. Hellerstein, Significant Sales and Use Tax Developments During the Past Half
Century, 39 VAND. L. REV. 961, 962 (1986).
20. Id.
2 1. LOCAL REVENUE DIVERSIFCATION, supra note 17, at 33.
22. 300 U.S. 577 (1937). This case involved a Washington use tax statute. Henneford v. Silas
Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 578 (1937).
23. 306 U.S. 62 (1939).
24. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62, 67-8 (1939).
25. 312 U.S. 359 (1941).
26. Nelson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 365-66 (1941).
27. Id. at 364. The Court relied on two facts to support its decision: (1) Sears enjoyed the
protection and services of the state; and (2) the state was justified in assuming that they were related to
the overall course of business by Sears in the taxing state. See id.
28. DUE & MIKESELL, supra note 2, at 245.
29. See Hartman, supra note 11, at 994; Anna M. Hoti, Finishing What Quill Started: The
Transactional Nexus Test for State Use Tax Collection, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1449, 1450 (1996).
6891997]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
well. 30 This has created another constitutional wrinkle in the already
complex arena of use taxes. 31
C. THE MULTISTATE TAX COMMISSION (MTC)
1. Formation of the MTC and Multistate Compact
In the late 1950s, several business groups became concerned about
the increased state power over taxation of interstate sales and income. 32
These groups lobbied Congress to pass federal legislation to reduce the
states' power of taxation. 33  Through the lobbying efforts of the busi-
ness community, Congress enacted Public Law No. 86-272.34 In that
statute and later amendments, Congress provided for investigation of
state taxation of multistate income and sales. 35 A subsequent study was
conducted by the Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate Com-
merce of the House Judiciary Committee (the Willis Subcommittee). 36
The report and recommendations of the Willis Subcommittee were
published in four volumes in 1964 and 1965.37 The principle recom-
mendations of the Willis Subcommittee were: (1) sales taxes should be
imposed only by the state in which the purchaser received physical
delivery; (2) use taxes should be legal, but only if state law provided a
credit for such taxes against previously paid sales taxes on the same
goods; (3) all taxes should be collected and remitted to the state by the
seller and a state could require an out-of-state firm to collect and remit
use taxes only if the vendor owned or leased realty in that state, had an
employee whose services were performed entirely in the state, or regular-
ly used its own vehicles or a private parcel service to make deliveries to
private residences; (4) the IRS should be given a role in the auditing of
30. See LOCAL REVENUE DIVERSIFICATION, supra note 17, at 33-4; see also DUE & MIKESELL, supra
note 2, at 293-94.
31. See, e.g., Associated Indust. v. Director of Revenue, 918 S.W.2d 780 (Mo. 1996) (challenging
local use taxes in Missouri).
32. See DUE & MIKESELL, supra note 2, at 272.
33. Id.
34. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
381-84 (1997)). Public Law 86-272 restricts a state from imposing a net income tax (or franchise tax
measured by net income) if the only business activity within the state is the solicitation of orders for
the sale of tangible personal property when the orders are sent outside the state for acceptance or
rejection, and, if accepted, are filled by shipment outside the state. Id.
35. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON I NTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, No. A- 105, STATE AND LOCAL
TAX'N OF OUT-OF-STATE MAIL ORDER SALES 58 (1986) [hereinafter MAIL ORDER SALES]. Later the
study was broadened to include sales and use taxes. See Act of April 1, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-17, 75
Stat 4 1.
36. MAIL ORDER SALES, supra note 35, at 59.
37. Special Subcomm. on State Tax'n of Interstate Commerce of the House Conn. on the




out-of-state sellers on a reimbursement basis; and (5) all out-of-state
vendors should be exempt on the first $100 of taxable sales in any
reporting period. 38
In October 1965, the Willis Subcommittee's recommendations were
reflected in House Bill 11798.39 In summary, this bill would have re-
quired all states to use a federal income tax base, would have compelled
them to allow the use of a two-factor apportionment formula for income
taxes, and would have enacted a uniform sales and use tax law with
federal oversight by the IRS as suggested by the Willis Subcommittee. 40
House Bill 11798 encountered serious objections from the states,
prompting the Willis Subcommittee to develop a substitute bill, House
Bill 16491, which was introduced in Congress in 1966.41 House Bill
16491 eliminated any provision for federal administration of state and
local taxes, while still limiting state and local jurisdiction to impose taxes
on multistate businesses. 42 The bill was never enacted into law.43
In response to the Willis Subcommittee and the resulting congres-
sional bills, state tax officials began to work on an alternative to federal
regulation. 44 During 1966, committees representing the National Associ-
ation of Tax Administrators, the National Association of Attorneys
General, and the National Legislative Conference, under the guise of the
Council of the State Governments, drafted the "Multistate Tax Com-
pact." 45 The Multistate Tax Compact (Compact) was a uniform statute
which, among other things, required states to: (1) give credit for sales
tax paid in another state; and (2) honor a vendor's good faith accep-
tance of exemption certificates to free him or her from future liability
should the purchaser use the item for taxable purposes.4 6 The Compact
also created the MTC, an interstate agency formed to represent the
states' interests, with an executive board composed of one person from




41. Id. The same bill was essentially introduced in Congress in 1967 as House Bill 2158. These
bills were each separately known as "The Willis Bill."
42. Id.
43. See id. at 59-60.
44. See id. at 78.
45. Id.
46. Multistate Tax Compact, 2 All States Guide (RIA) 1731-32, at 755 (Sept. 5, 1995). "Each
purchaser liable for a use tax on tangible personal property shall be entitled to full credit for the
combined amount or amounts of legally imposed sales or use taxes paid by him with respect to the
same property to another State and any subdivision thereof." Id. at 73 I.
47. Id. at 735 ("[The Multistate Tax Commission] shall be composed of one 'member' from
each party State who shall be the head of the state agency charged with the administration of the type
of taxes to which this compact applies").
1997]
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ratification by seven states, 48 which occurred in 1967 when Nevada
enacted the uniform statute.
The 1965 Willis Subcommittee Report criticized the lack of unifor-
mity and cooperation among states in both income and sales and use
taxes, concluding that the situation created "confusion, uncertainty, and
over and under taxation." 49 In response to these criticisms, the MTC set
out to create uniformity among state taxation of income and sales in
order to prevent the proposal of federal legislation limiting a state's
ability to tax out-of-state vendors. 50
2. Objectives of the MTC and Current Membership
The MTC has two primary objectives: (1) encouraging states to
adopt uniform tax laws and regulations; and (2) encouraging businesses
to comply with state tax laws.5  To foster uniformity, the MTC engages
in a number of initiatives. The goal of these initiatives is creating
"[g]reater uniformity in multistate taxation," helping to insure that
"interstate commerce is neither undertaxed nor overtaxed," and seeking
to "eliminate the danger that Congress will intervene in state taxa-
tion." 52 Uniformity initiatives recently adopted by the MTC included
regulations apportioning broadcast industry income, the Model S
Corporation Income Tax Act, regulations apportioning publishing
industry income, and uniform principles governing state transactional
taxation of telecommunications. 53 Recent uniformity initiatives being
developed by the MTC include, among other proposed initiatives, a
uniform post-Quill definition of "minimum contacts nexus" and
"substantial nexus." 54
The compliance component of the MTC's objectives is achieved in
two principal ways. First, the MTC maintains a Joint Audit Program,
which audits businesses across state lines for sales, use, and income
taxes. 55 The goals of the Joint Audit Program are: (1) to serve the
compliance function of the several states by identifying non-compliance
with state tax laws; and (2) to help states learn about new industry
conditions and circumstances which, in turn, will help create uniformity
48. Id. at 777.
49. MAIL ORDER SALES, supra note 35, at 78.
50. See id.
51. Multistate Tax Commission, About the Multistate Tax Comm'n (visited Jan. 8, 1998) <http'I/
www.mtc.gov/aboutmtc/Aboutmtc.HTM>.
52. Id.
53. MULTISTATE TAX COMM'N, MEMBERSHIP AND CURRENT AcTIvrIEs 3 (Jan. 1, 1997) [hereinafter
MEMBERSHIP].
54. Id. at 5.
55. Id. at 6-7.
692 [VOL. 73:685
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in taxpayer treatment. 56 Second, the MTC has created the National
Nexus Program, which was formed to "help encourage voluntary
disclosure and discover businesses that are failing to file returns with the
states." 57
To become a member of the MTC, a state must enact the
Compact. 58 There are currently twenty-one Compact member states,
including the District of Columbia. 59 One representative from each of
these states is allowed to sit on the executive board of the MTC. In turn,
the executive board elects the Executive Director of the MTC.60
The MTC has sixteen associate members. 61 These members partici-
pate in and help finance one or more of the following MTC programs
and projects: the Joint Audit Program; the National Nexus Program; the
Property Tax Fairness Project; and the Unitary Exchange Project. 62 In
addition to the associate members, the MTC also has project members
who participate in various projects of the MTC.63 Current project
members are involved in the National Nexus Program, the Joint Audit
Program, and the Unitary Exchange Project. 64
3. National Nexus Program: A Glimpse of the MTC Initiative
The MTC's National Nexus Program was founded in December of
1990 and began operating in 1991.65 Currently, thirty-five states and
the District of Columbia participate in the Nexus Program.66 The Nexus
Program's purpose is to "get non-complying multistate businesses to
register and pay major state taxes." 67 The Program tries to accomplish
56. See id.
57. See id. at 7-8.
58. See id at 1.
59. The Compact member states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, District
of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Washington. See id.
60. Multistate Tax Compact, 2 All States Guide (RIA) 1 735 (Sept. 5, 1995). The current MTC
Executive Director is Dan R. Bucks.
61. See MEMBERSHIP supra note 53, at 2. The associate members are: Arizona, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Wisconsin, and West Virginia. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. Id. The current project members are: Iowa, Kentucky, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Rhode Island,
and South Carolina. Id.
65. See id. at 7.
66. MULTISTATE TAXCOMM'N, NATIONAL NExus PROGRAM, VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE 3 (August 1,
1997). The states participating in the program are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.
67. See MEMBERSHIP supra note 53, at 7.
1997]
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this purpose through the following activities: (1) voluntary disclosure;
(2) a clearinghouse database; (3) nexus investigations; and (4) education,
information, and other compliance activities. 68
The voluntary disclosure process affords companies the opportunity
to simultaneously approach multiple states and anonymously offer to
resolve potential liabilities resulting from a number of years of non-
filing. 69 The states generally dictate the process for voluntary business
disclosure, and the Nexus Program processes the disclosures for the
states. 70 To date, this program has produced settlements with taxpayers
totaling approximately $47.1 million. 71
The clearinghouse database allows a participating state access to
audits relating to a taxpayer's activities in other states. 72 This database
provides a means for the participating states to identify and obtain infor-
mation on companies involved in interstate commerce and information
on any nexus-creating activities within a state.73
The nexus investigations arm of the Nexus Program examines the
activities of a given company to determine whether it has a history of tax
compliance problems with any of the participating states. 74 Pertinent
information gathered from this process is forwarded to the applicable
state or states and the Joint Audit Program to determine whether the
company under investigation should be audited to uncover nexus
creating activities within a given state. 75
Finally, the Nexus Program staff aims to educate the member states
and multistate bisinesses on state tax law and compliance require-
ments. 76 A recent outgrowth of this initiative was Bulletin 95-1.77 The
National Nexus Program released Bulletin 95-1 as an educational flyer
concerning the nexus requirement. Many commentators believe that Bul-
letin 95-1 goes beyond current constitutional restraints imposed on multi-
state taxation of out-of-state vendors.78 Additionally, since Bulletin 95-1









77. See supra note 8 and infra notes 159-72 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of
Bulletin 95-1.
78. Many organizations and entities do not support the Bulletin. See, e.g., Deal F. Andal, Fran-
chise Board Member Criticizes Board Actions, SOFTWARE TAX'N LETTER (May 1996); Kaye K. Cald-
well, Software Industry Coalition Response: 95-1 is Fundamentally Flawed, SOFTWARE TAX'N LETrER
(May 1996); CoMMITTEE ON STATE TAX'N, Cost Opposes MTC Nexus Bulletin 95-1, STATE TAX NOTEs,
March 25, 1996, 973, at 973.
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was released as an education flyer rather than a regulation, it was not
subjected to public comment. 79 The lack of public involvement has
created tension between the business community and the MTC.80
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE
A state can impose a use tax collection duty on an out-of-state seller
only if this obligation does not exceed certain constitutional limits. The
Commerce ClauseSl and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment 82 represent the constitutional barriers against the imposition
of a use tax collection duty. The Supreme Court has decided many pivot-
al cases in this area, but Quill is the seminal case. Quill described the two
types of nexus: Due Process nexus and Commerce Clause nexus.
A. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE: THE THINNEST STANDARD
The Due Process Clause requires "some definite link, some mini-
mum connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction
it seeks to tax," 83 and the income attributed to the state for tax purposes
must be rationally related to "values connected with the taxing State." 84
The relevant inquiry to decide whether a Due Process nexus exists is
whether an out-of-state vendor has minimum contacts with the jurisdic-
tion such that the imposition of a use tax collection responsibility does
not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 85 If
the vendor "purposefully avails itself of the benefits of an economic
79. The MTC repeatedly presents its Bulletin as the existing law, even though the Bulletin was not
subject to any type of formal public hearing in the 26 states. The procedural enactment of the Bulletin
will not be discussed in this article. However, the following is one author's summary of the lack of
formal public hearings related to the Bulletin:
The opportunity for analysis should have been presented prior to the MTC asking
the states to adopt and agree to enforce the Bulletin. Their stealthy methods for getting it
adopted in California, their mischaracterization of the nature of the document as well as
its content, and their total disregard for state law in asking the states to adopt it have all
led to extreme distrust of the organization and its purposes.
Kaye K. Caldwell, 'Dispassionate' Debate on Bulletin 95-1 ?, STATE TAX NOTES, Aug. 27, 1996, at 20;
see also Kaye K. Caldwell, Software Industry Coalition Response: 95-1 Is Fundamentally Flawed,
SOFTWARE TAX'N LETrER (May 1996).
80. See Committee on State Tax'n, COST Submits Comments On Multistate Tax Commission's
Public Participation Policies, STATE TAX NOTES, Oct. 29, 1996, at 1321 (stating that the "results of the
Bulletin... have been (1) disruptive of the MTC's legitimate mission and processes and (2) productive
of increased mistrust between the MTC and taxpayers").
81. U.S. CONST. art. i, §8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power to... regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States").
82. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 ("No state shall ...deprive any person of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law").
83. See Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954).
84. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978).
85. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
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market" in the state where the purchaser is located, it may subject itself
to the state's jurisdiction even if it has no physical presence in the state.86
In Quill, the Court concluded that "purposeful availment" is the proper
Due Process test to apply to the burden of collecting use taxes, explicitly
overruling precedent that required physical presence in a state for the
imposition of this burden.87
Therefore, for purposes of a Due Process nexus, an out-of-state
seller does not have to be physically present in the state; mere economic
presence in a state will be sufficient. For instance, an economic presence
in a state, such as the hypothetical direct marketing computer software
company given as an example in Bulletin 95-1,88 will produce the
minimum contacts necessary for a Due Process Clause nexus. 89
However, as stated in Quill, "a corporation may have the 'minimum
contacts' with a taxing State as required by the Due Process Clause, and
yet lack the 'substantial nexus' with that State as required by the
Commerce Clause." 90
B. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE: A JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION
The Constitution gives Congress plenary power to regulate interstate
commerce. 9 1 As such, Congress has the authority to supersede any
decision of the Supreme Court as it relates to the regulation of interstate
commerce. 92 However, in the area of sales and use taxation and nexus,
Congress has never exercised its regulatory interstate commerce power,
but has instead left the task of establishing such nexus standards to the
Supreme Court.
The Commerce Clause restrictions on state taxation are currently
embodied in the four-pronged test set forth in Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Brady.93 A tax will be sustained against a Commerce Clause chal-
lenge as long as the tax: (1) is applied to an activity with a "substantial
nexus" with the taxing state; (2) is fairly apportioned; (3) does not
discriminate against interstate commerce; and (4) is fairly related to the
86. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307 (1992) (citing Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985)).
87. Id. at 308. This invalidated the rule in National Bellas Hess v. Illinois Dep't of Rev., 386
U.S. 753, 758 (1967), requiring physical presence in a state before the liability associated with use
taxes could be imposed upon an out-of-state seller.
88. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
89. This notion is consistent with the Burger King holding. See Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 476 (1985).
90. Quill, 504 U.S. at 313.
91. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 3.
92. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 318.
93. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
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services provided by the state.94 The first prong has always been the
most difficult hurdle for state governments to clear.
1. Physical Presence
A substantial nexus for sales and use tax purposes can only exist
where the vendor has a physical presence in the taxing state.95 The
Supreme Court, in National Bellas Hess v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue,
explicitly made some physical presence of the vendor in the taxing state
a requirement under the Commerce Clause. In National Bellas Hess,
Illinois imposed a use tax collection obligation on a mail order company
that had its principal place of business in Missouri and its place of
incorporation in Delaware. 96 The company (National Bellas Hess) did
not maintain any office or other place of business in Illinois, nor did it
have an agent, sales person, or other representative in Illinois. 97 The
only contact that National Bellas Hess had with Illinois was that it mailed
catalogs twice a year to the company's active or recent customers who
resided in Illinois, mailed "flyers" occasionally to past and potential
customers, received orders through the mail from Illinois customers,
filled the orders, and sent the goods via the mail or common carrier back
to the particular customers. 98
The Illinois Department of Revenue imposed a duty to collect use
tax on National Bellas Hess because it was deemed to be maintaining a
place of business in Illinois.99 The definition of "retailer maintaining a
place of business" in Illinois included the following: "[a retailer] engag-
ing in soliciting orders within this State from users by means of cata-
logues or other advertising, whether such orders are received or accepted
within or without this State."100 In finding in favor of the taxpayer, the
94. Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
95. National Bellas Hess v. Illinois Dep't of Rev.. 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967). In addition, such
physical presence in a state must be greater than just the "slightest presence." Quill, 504 U.S. at 315
n.8; see also National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756; National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of
Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 556 (1977).
96. National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 754.
97. Id.
[National] does not maintain in Illinois any office, distribution house, sales house,
warehouse or any other place of business; it does not have in Illinois any agent,
salesman, canvasser, solicitor or other type of representative to sell or take orders, to
deliver merchandise, to accept payments, or to service merchandise it sells; it does not
own any tangible property, real or personal, in Illinois; it has no telephone listing in
Illinois and it has not advertised its merchandise for sale in newspapers, on billboards, or
by radio or television in Illinois.
Id. (quoting the Illinois Supreme Court).
98. Id. at 754-55.
99. See id.
100. Id. at 755 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 439.2 (1965)).
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Court ruled that the statute burdened National Bellas Hess in violation of
the Commerce Clause.'O'
The test for whether a "state exaction" violated the Commerce
Clause was whether the taxation falling on interstate commerce could be
"justified as designed to make such commerce bear a fair share of the
cost of the local government whose protection it enjoys." 0 2 The Court
held that Illinois could not impose the burden of collecting its use tax on
National Bellas Hess and rested its decision on two principles. First, the
Court drew a distinction between mail order sellers with retail outlets,
solicitors, or property within a state and "those who do no more than
communicate with customers in the State by mail or common carrier as
part of a general interstate business."103 Second, the Court foresaw that
if the tax in Illinois was upheld against National Bellas Hess, there would
be impediments on the free conduct of interstate business. 104 The Court
simply stated that sustaining Illinois' right to tax National Bellas Hess
"could entangle National's interstate business in a virtual welter of
complicated obligations to local jurisdictions with no legitimate claim to
impose a fair share of the cost of the local government."1 05 In sum-
mary, National Bellas Hess still stands for the proposition that a vendor
whose only contacts with a taxing state are by mail or common carrier
lacks the "substantial nexus" required by the Commerce Clause. 0 6
2. Sales Force, Plant, or Office
Beyond the National Bellas Hess safe harbor, Quill indicates that
"the presence in the taxing State of a small sales force, plant, or office"
is probably required to compel a vendor to collect a sales or use
tax.107 This proposition originated in National Geographic Society v.
California Board of Equalization.10 8 In National Geographic, the
Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether an out-of-state seller
101. Id. at 760.
102. Id. at 756 (quoting Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946)).
103. Id. at 758; see also General Trading Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944); Nelson v.
Montgomery Ward, 312 U.S. 373 (1941); Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941); Felt v.
Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939).
104. National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 759.
105. Id. at 759-60. The Court noted that a decision in favor of Illinois would allow every other
state, municipality, school district, and political subdivision in the United States to impose a tax upon
National Bellas Hess. Id. at 759. It was the many rates of tax, allowable exemptions, and the admini-
strative record-keeping of such taxes that the Court stated would unduly burden National Bellas Hess'
interstate business. Id.
106. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992). In addition, National Bellas Hess
indicates that physical presence has not been achieved without "retail outlets, solicitors, or property
within a state." National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758.
107. Quill, 504 U.S. at 315.
108. 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
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could constitutionally be required to collect use taxes under the Com-
merce Clause.109 The out-of-state seller was the National Geographic
Society and the taxing state was California. 110 National Geographic
maintained two offices in California that solicited advertising copy for its
monthly magazine. Ill These offices did not perform any sales activities
related to National Geographic's mail-order business in the District of
Columbia, which sold maps, atlases, globes, and books. 112 All orders for
these items were mailed directly to National Geographic in Washington,
D.C., and deliveries of the magazine were made, via U.S. mail, from
National Geographic's Washington, D.C. or Maryland offices."i 3
California maintained that National Geographic was subject to
the burden of collecting use tax from the sales of merchandise in that
state due to the two offices it maintained in the state.'1 4 The Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether these offices provided a "sufficient
nexus between the out-of-state seller appellant and the State-as required
by .. . the Commerce Clause-to support the imposition of a use-tax
collection liability"115
The Court concluded that National Geographic's "maintenance of
two offices in California and the activities there adequately established
a relationship or 'nexus' between the Society and the State," rendering
the obligation to collect and remit use taxes constitutional."l 6 The test
the Court used to decide whether National Geographic maintained a
sufficient nexus with the state to require liability for use tax collection
was whether the facts demonstrated "some definite link, some minimum
connection," between the state and the person it sought to tax. 117 The
Court stated that there was "no risk of double taxation to the seller,"
because the out-of-state seller only became liable for the use tax
109. National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 554 (1977).
110. Id. at 552-53.
111. Id at 552.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 553. The relevant statute at the time of the case made every "retailer engaged in busi-
ness in [California] and making sale of tangible personal property for storage, use, or other consump-
tion in [California]" subject to the burden of collecting use tax. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 6203 (West
1987). The California Supreme Court had ruled that National Geographic was a "retailer engaged in
business in [California]," because its maintenance of the two offices [brought it] within the definition
under § 6203(a) that included "[alny retailer maintaining ... an office." National Geographic Soc'y
v. California Bd. of Equalization, 547 P.2d 458, 460-61 (1976).
115. National Geographic Soc'y, 430 U.S. at 554.
116. Id. at 556. In upholding California's right to impose a duty to collect use tax on National
Geographic, the court stated that it did not agree with California's use of a "slightest presence"
standard to define nexus. Id.
117. Id. at 561 (quoting Miller Bros. Co., 347 U.S. at 344-45).
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by failing or refusing to collect the tax from an in-state resident
consumer.11 8
The Court also stated that there was a "sharp distinction . . . be-
tween mail order sellers with retail outlets, solicitors, or property within
[the taxing] State, and those [like Bellas Hess] who do no more than
communicate with customers in the State by mail or common carrier as
part of a general interstate business."11 9 The Court ruled that National
Geographic fell within the "former category."120 The Court noted that
the disassociation between the nexus creating activities of National
Geographic (i.e., two offices within the state) and the activities giving rise
to the liability for the collection of the use tax (i.e., sale of National
Geographic publications in the state) did not "bar the imposition of the
use tax collection duty."121 In the end, the Supreme Court held that
National Geographic's "continuous presence in California in offices
that solicit advertising for its magazine provide[d] a sufficient nexus to
justify that State's imposition upon the Society of the duty" to collect
use tax. 122
The Supreme Court has allowed states to constitutionally impose a
use tax collection duty on a retailer in two other general instances,
namely where the retailer has: (1) an employee regularly and continu-
ously working in the state; 123 or (2) agents or third-party representatives
regularly and continuously present in the state whose activities directly
relate to sales of tangible personal property.1 24
3. Employee: Regular and Continuous Presence
The Supreme Court has ruled that the regular and continuous pres-
ence in a state by an employee of an out-of-state seller can satisfy the
nexus requirement of the Commerce Clause. The decision which best
illustrates this point is Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Washington Depart-
ment of Revenue. 125 In Standard Pressed Steel, the Court considered
118. Id. at 558.
119. Id. at 559 (quoting National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758).
120. Id. The opinion stipulated that the maintenance of two offices in California and solicitation
by employees in those offices in the range of $1 million annually created a substantial presence. Id. at
556.
121. Id. at 560. The Court also stated that the "Society's two offices, without regard to the nature
of their activities, had the advantage of the same municipal services-fire and police protection, and
the like-as they would have had if their activities ... included assistance to the mail order operations
that generated the use taxes." Id. at 561.
122. Id. at 562.
123. See, e.g., Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Washington Dep't of Rev., 419 U.S. 560 (1975).
124. See, e.g., Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960); Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v.
Washington Dep't of Rev., 483 U.S. 232 (1987).
125. 419 U.S. 560 (1975).
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whether a gross receipts tax collection responsibility imposed by the
State of Washington violated the Due Process Clause. 126 Standard was a
manufacturer of industrial and aerospace fasteners with its home office
in Pennsylvania, one manufacturing plant there, and another in Califor-
nia. 127 Its principal customer in the State of Washington was the Boeing
Company in Seattle.128 In the years in question, Standard employed one
person in Washington to "consult with Boeing regarding its anticipated
needs and requirements for aerospace fasteners and to follow up any
difficulties in the use of [Standard's] product after delivery."1 29 The
employee took no orders for Standard and had no office in Washington
except in his home.130 Standard kept an answering service for the em-
ployee in the Seattle area, and the bills for this service were sent to Stan-
dard.131 Additionally, once every six weeks the employee was assisted
by a group of engineers from Standard on the Boeing account.1
32
The State of Washington assessed a gross receipts tax on Standard
resulting from its sales of fasteners to Boeing. 133 Standard argued that
imposing the tax collecting duty violated Due Process because its in-state
activities were "so thin and inconsequential" as to make the tax on
activities occurring beyond the borders of Washington one which had
"no reasonable relation to the protection and benefits conferred by the
taxing State."1 34  The Supreme Court rebuffed this argument. The
Court stated that the in-state services provided by the salesman were
substantial in "relation to the establishment and maintenance of sales,
upon which the tax was measured."1 35 Accordingly, the Court held
against Standard and upheld the tax imposed by Washington.1
36
126. See Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Washington Dep't of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560, 562 (1975).






133. Id. at 561-62. The State Tax Board found that the activities of the Standard employee:
were necessary to [Standard] in making it aware of which products Boeing might use, in
obtaining the engineering design of those products, in securing the testing of sample
products to qualify them for sale to Boeing, in resolving problems of their use after
receipt by Boeing, in obtaining and retaining goodwill and rapport with Boeing personnel,
and in keeping the invoicing personnel of [Standard] up to date on Boeing's list of
purchasing specialists or control buyers.
Id. at 561. Accordingly, the Washington State Board of Tax Appeals assessed a business and
occupation tax against Standard under WASH. REV. CODE § 82.04.270 (1995). Id. at 561-62.
134. Id. at 562.
135. Id. at 563 (quoting General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 447 (1964)).
136. Id. at 563-64. The Court also discussed the Commerce Clause and the risk of multiple
taxation. The Court noted that the tax in this case was on "gross receipts from sales made to a local
consumer," and that the tax was 'apportioned exactly to the activities taxed,' all of which were
intrastate." Id. at 564. Therefore, the Commerce Clause was not violated by the tax imposed in this
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Although Standard Pressed Steel was a Due Process Clause case
when decided, the principles enunciated in the opinion are equally
applicable to a Commerce Clause analysis. The case stands for the
proposition that an employee of an out-of-state vendor, who maintains a
substantial, continuous, and on-going "relation to the establishment and
maintenance of sales" in a particular state, creates a Commerce Clause
nexus for the vendor.
4. Third-Party Representatives: Regular and Continuous
Solicitation
Not only can employees create a Commerce Clause nexus for an
out-of-state seller, but third-party representatives (or independent
contractors) performing continuous and regular solicitation in the taxing
state can create nexus for an out-of-state vendor. This proposition is
illustrated in the following two cases: (1) Scripto, Inc. v. Carson;137 and
(2) Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington Department of Revenue. 138
Scripto is one of the Supreme Court's most far-reaching decisions
concerning use taxes. 139 In the case, a Georgia corporation (Scripto)
sold and shipped mechanical writing instruments to Florida customers
from its place of business in Georgia. 4 0 Scripto had entered into
contracts with wholesalers in Florida to solicit orders for its product. 141
Each of the wholesalers was furnished catalogs, samples, and advertising
material, and was actively engaged in Florida as Scripto's representative
for the purpose of attracting, soliciting, and obtaining Florida cus-
tomers.1 42 The wholesalers were considered independent contractors,
and Scripto did not: (1) own, lease, or maintain any office, distributing
house, warehouse, or other place of business in Florida; or (2) have any
regular employee or agent there.143 The issue before the Court was
whether Florida could impose a use tax collection responsibility based
on the presence of an independent sales force in Florida.' 44
The Supreme Court held that a nexus had been established by
Scripto and the imposition of the use tax was proper.145 There were a
number of factors the Supreme Court cited to support its decision. The
case. Id.
137. 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
138. 483 U.S. 232 (1987).
139. Scripto has been "the furthest extension of [a state's taxing] power" under the Constitution.
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306 (1992) (alteration in the original).
140. See Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 207-08 (1960).
141. Id. at 209.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 210.
145. Id. at 210-11. The Supreme Court based its decision on the test articulated in Miller Bros.
Co., 347 U.S. at 344-45, which stated that there must be "some definite link, some minimum
connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax." Id.
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primary factor influencing the Supreme Court was the "systematic and
continuous" activities of the wholesalers in Florida.14 6 The Court stated
that the salesmen conducted "continuous local solicitation in Florida,"
and the "only incidence of [the] sales transaction" that was not local
was the acceptance of the orders by Scripto.147
In Tyler Pipe, the taxpayer argued that it did not have a substantial
nexus with the State of Washington under the Commerce Clause and,
therefore, Washington could not impose a gross receipts tax collection
responsibility on the taxpayer.1 48 Tyler Pipe sold a large volume of case
iron, pressure and plastic pipe and fittings, and drainage products in
Washington, but all of those products were manufactured in other
states.149 The company had no office, property, or employees residing
in Washington.150 Its solicitation of business in Washington was directed
by executives who maintained their offices out-of-state and by an
independent contractor located in Seattle.151 The sales representatives in
Washington acted on a daily basis on behalf of Tyler Pipe in calling on
its customers and soliciting orders. 152  Through sales contacts, the
representatives "maintained and improved the name recognition, market
share, goodwill, and individual customer relations of Tyler Pipe."1 53
According to the Court, the "crucial factor governing nexus" was
whether the activities performed in Washington on behalf of the taxpayer
were "significantly associated with the taxpayer's ability to establish and
maintain a market in [Washington] for the sales."' 54 Because the
independent contractor was necessary for the maintenance and protec-
tion of Tyler Pipe's interests in the state, the Court ruled that "the
activities of Tyler's sales representatives adequately support[ed] the
State's jurisdiction to impose its wholesale tax on Tyler."155
146. Id. at 211.
147. Id.
148. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington Dep't of Rev., 483 U.S. 232, 239-40 (1987). There
were two appeals before the Court: one dealt with whether the tax imposed by Washington facially
discriminated against interstate commerce; the other appeal considered whether a taxpayer had a
sufficient nexus with Washington so that a tax could be imposed upon the taxpayer and whether the
imposed tax was fairly apportioned. Only the Court's analysis of the nexus issue is discussed herein.




153. Id. (quoting Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington Dep't of Rev., 715 P.2d 123, 127 (1985)).
154. Id. at 250 (quoting Tyler Pipe, 715 P.2d at 126).
155. Id. The Court also made clear that the fact that the sales representatives were independent
contractors and not agents of Tyler Pipe had no bearing on the analysis for nexus. Id.; see also
Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 211 (1960); National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of
Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 556-58 (1977).
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C. PUTTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL PIECES TOGETHER
In summary, the Supreme Court has allowed states to constitu-
tionally impose a use tax collection duty on a retailer in only three
general instances. The first case is where an out-of-state vendor has an
office, place of business, or other significant ownership of property
within the taxing state. National Geographic stands for this principle.
In National Geographic, the presence of a large office building in
California provided the necessary nexus allowing California to impose a
use tax collection duty on National Geographic.1 56
The second instance permitting a collection mandate involves the
presence of an employee who is regularly and continuously working
within the taxing state, even if the employee's activities do not specifical-
ly involve the solicitation of in-state sales. In Standard Pressed Steel, the
out-of-state vendor's employee performed regular and continuous
activities in the state of Washington.157 This level of activity provided the
vendor with the requisite constitutional nexus required for the imposition
of a use tax collection duty. There is a general consensus in the business
community that either having an office, place of business or other
property, or an employee who regularly and continuously works within
the taxing state amounts to a substantial nexus.
Finally, a substantial nexus is also established if a vendor's agents or
third-party representatives are regularly and continuously present in the
taxing state, but only where their activities are directly related to actual
sales of tangible personal property. As previously discussed, Scripto and
Tyler Pipe are the leading cases that have established this general rule.158
Nonetheless, businesses have recently been the target of tremendous
pressures from many states who have collectively maintained that the
substantial nexus standard outlined in Quill extends beyond the limits
the Court reached in Scripto and Tyler Pipe. Specifically, the states have
strongly indicated that any type of regular presence of such independent
representatives working on behalf of the vendor would push the taxpayer
beyond the Quill safe harbor.
IV. BULLETIN 95-1: PUSHING THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
ENVELOPE
Through the issuance of Bulletin 95-1, the MTC has attempted to
unilaterally expand the definition of "substantial nexus." By acqui-
156. See supra notes 108-22 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 125-36 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 137-55 and accompanying text.
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escing to Bulletin 95-1, twenty-five states have maintained that their laws
are consistent with the Bulletin, 159 and the MTC has stated that Bulletin
95-1 is supported by the current constitutional principles of the
Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause. According to the MTC,
Bulletin 95-1 is only a statement of currently existing constitutional
standards.160 In actuality, as discussed below, it is symbolic of the
MTC's ever expanding view of Commerce Clause substantial nexus.
A. THE MTC POSITION
In Bulletin 95-1, the MTC genuinely embarks on a quest to educate
computer companies concerning voluntary compliance with currently
existing federal nexus standards. 161 Bulletin 95-1 mentions that "state
tax officials too often find that companies are not complying with
existing standards," and that the states are now seeking voluntary
compliance through education and information. 162
To accomplish the states' mission, the MTC chose to announce its
expansive position on nexus in a case study fashion through the selec-
tion and analysis of a specific industry. 163 Bulletin 95-1 sets forth the
nexus consequences of an imaginary direct marketer of computers and
related equipment that also provides warranty repair services to its
customers through authorized third-party representatives that are located
in the same states as the customers. 164 The warranty permits a customer
to obtain on-site repair of the computer through a third-party service
provider. In order to obtain a repair, the customer must first contact the
direct marketer, who, in turn, authorizes and makes arrangements for the
third-party to perform the repair work in the taxing state either at the
customer's location or at a site determined by the third-party service
159. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
160. See BULLETIN 95-1, supra note 8, at 2.
161. This computer company education and compliance project is an innovative effort designed
to achieve the following purposes:
Education-informing the public of the nexus standards applicable to specific industry
practice;
Efficiency-saving the public and private sectors time and money by achieving
necessary tax compliance in the most efficient means possible-voluntarily;
Respect for taxpayer rights-recognizing that each business has the right to make
informed decisions about their tax compliance responsibilities, including their right to
disagree with State taxing authorities;
Cooperation with taxpayers--offering businesses assistance in determining applicable
nexus standards and filing responsibilities and help with voluntary compliance.
BULLETIN 95-1, supra note 8, at 1.
162. Id. at 5.
163. The MTC has made it clear that the fact pattern for the selected industry is for illustrative
purposes only, and it should not be interpreted to exclude other instances involving similar, but not
identical, fact patterns. Id. at 1.
164. Id.
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provider. In this instance, the MTC states that the computer company
has a constitutional nexus in a state for the purposes of use tax and
income, franchise, or comparable tax liability. 165 Bulletin 95-1 contains
a legal analysis attempting to support the MTC's position from a consti-
tutional and. statutory position.
The analysis indicates that the Due Process Clause and the Com-
merce Clause of the Constitution support a liberal approach to defining
the use tax nexus. According to the MTC, the presence of representa-
tives of the direct marketing computer company providing repair
services in the customer's state will generate a constitutional nexus. 166
The MTC proclaims that "the critical test for nexus is whether the
activities performed in this state on behalf of the taxpayer are signifi-
cantly associated with the taxpayer's ability to establish and maintain a
market in this state for the sales." 167 The MTC later states "[a]s in Tyler
Pipe, these in-state activities (warranty repair service provided by com-
puter either in standard warranty or by option of purchase) which
develop goodwill and increased market share, are no less important or
beneficial to the out-of-state direct marketing computer company
because they are performed by an independent third-party repair
service." 168
B. THE TRUE MEANING OF BULLETIN 95-1
It is important to recall that the MTC was created by the states
to circumvent federal regulation of state taxes and to increase the
revenue base of member states. Accordingly, the MTC has aggressively
taken the position that in-state warranty repair activities of an out-of-
state vendor's independent contractors are "regular and systematic"1 69
and are "significantly associated" with the out-of-state vendor's ability
to "establish and maintain a market" for computer hardware sales inside
the state, 170 thus creating a sufficient nexus for the state to impose
on the computer company a use tax collection responsibility on sales
to customers in those states. In addition to repair services, Bulletin
95-1 indicates that "other activities conducted by or on behalf of a
165. Id. at 2.
166. Id. at 4.
167. Id. at 3 (citing Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 250).
168. Id.
169. According to the MTC, activities that are regular or systematic and in furtherance of the
seller's business are not trivial; therefore, they are not to be considered de minimis activity that does
not rise to the level of constitutional nexus. Id. at 2.
170. See Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington Dep't of Rev., 483 U.S. 232, 250 (1987).
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computer company in a taxing State may also independently create [a]
constitutional . . . nexus." 17 1
According to the MTC, the fact that the in-state services are actually
performed by a third-party (as opposed to an employee) is of no consti-
tutional significance, because the out-of-state vendor has authorized the
in-state service provider to perform the necessary repairs on its behalf.17 2
The following section provides suggestions on how to prepare for sales
and use tax audits and combat this type of unfounded state aggression.
V. RESPONDING TO STATE (AND MTC) AUDITORS
What level of activity or physical presence constitutes "substantial
nexus" necessary to satisfy the Commerce Clause? Due to the Quill
Court's failure to specifically define that phrase, this issue can only be
considered on a case-by-case basis. If a business encounters an out-of-
state tax auditor (or MTC auditor) who indicates that the business may
owe a tax liability, based on an assertion that Bulletin 95-1 represents an
accurate reflection of current constitutional law, the company may
respond in one of two ways.
A. THE DUE PROCESS DEFENSE
The best approach, of course, would be to prevent the auditor from
visiting the business in the first place. A business can attempt to avoid an
audit altogether under a Due Process theory, but continuous sales into a
state will likely establish the minimum contacts necessary to override a
Due Process argument. Still, an auditor might respect a company's
insistence that the state has no right to conduct an audit because it may
not be worth the auditor's time or expense to litigate the procedural
issue. 173 Assuming the business cannot prevent the auditor from making
a visit, a second response is to make several legal arguments that will
discourage the auditor from making an assessment. For obvious reasons,
company personnel should present these positions to the auditor as early
as possible in the audit process.
171. See BULLETIN 95-1, supra note 8, at 1.
172. Id. at 4.
173. David J. Bradford, Tips for Handling Corporate Tax Audits, SOFTWARE TAX'N LETrER, March
1996, at 36.
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B. ANTI-NEXUS ARGUMENTS TO DISCOURAGE AN AUDITOR'S
ASSESSMENT
1. Nexus Must be Present as a Matter of State Law
In Bulletin 95-1, the MTC makes a sweeping assumption that the
statutes of all of the endorsing states require use tax collection by the
out-of-state vendor in the sample fact pattern situation. This is quite an
oversight, as constitutional arguments are meaningless if they are in
reference to a principle that is contrary to state law. Therefore, the
person assigned to refute the audit should first look for the state taxing
statute that implements a use tax collection responsibility.
As a general rule, a retailer that is "engaged in business" or "do-
ing business" in a taxing state is required to collect tax from an in-state
purchaser. While each state's interpretation of "engaged in business"
or "doing business" may vary, these phrases for sales and use tax
collection purposes generally refer to vendors that are physically present
in the state. If a retailer is not engaged in or doing business in a state
within the meaning of the state's statutes, no constitutional question
needs to be addressed because a use tax collection duty cannot be
imposed under state law. In other words, an otherwise constitutionally
permissible duty to collect use tax is only enforceable against a retailer if
state law contains a statute that requires the retailer to collect the tax.
Consider, for example, California law. According to the statutes,
"[e]very retailer engaged in business in this state and making sales of
tangible personal property for storage, use, or other consumption in this
state. . . shall, at the time of making the sales. . . collect [use] tax from
the purchaser . ." 174 The collection responsibility, therefore, applies
only to retailers who are "engaged in business" in California. Based on
pure California statutory analysis, the computer company in the Bulletin
95-1 example would not be required to collect use tax on sales to its
California customers because the company would not technically be
"engaged in business" in California. The statutes would require the
computer company to collect tax only if it either: (a) maintained a place
of business in California; or (b) engaged an agent or independent
contractor in California to sell, deliver, install, assemble, or take orders
174. CAL. REV. & TAx CODE § 6203 (1996).
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for tangible personal property.175 Based on the fact pattern in Bulletin
95-1, the computer company does not meet either of these criteria.
Because the physical presence in California of the third-party
service provider is not connected with sales of the computer company's
tangible personal property, the computer company is not "engaged in
business" in California. 176 Accordingly, the California statutes do not
authorize the state to impose a use tax collection duty upon the
out-of-state computer company based solely on its use of an in-state
third-party repair company.177 This statutory finding renders moot any
additional constitutional analysis.
2. Some Adopting States May Not Have the Authority to
Follow Bulletin 95-1
Even if the state conducting the audit has signed on to Bulletin
95-1, the state might not have the authority to follow it. Texas is a good
example of this; its "engaged in business" statute is quite similar to
California's.178 If a computer vendor's only in-state contact with Texas
is through the use of a service company providing warranty repairs, the
vendor would technically not be "engaged in business" in Texas
according to state law. Because it is not engaged in business in Texas,
the vendor would not be subject to a use tax collection responsibility
despite the state's adoption of Bulletin 95-1.179
Some states have recently handled this type of inconsistency by
changing their laws to conform with Bulletin 95-1. Kentucky, for
175. A retailer engaged in business in California primarily includes:
(a) Any retailer maintaining, occupying, or using, permanently or temporarily, directly or
indirectly, or through a subsidiary, or agent ... an office, place of distribution .... or
other place of business," and (b) Any retailer having any representative, agent, sales-
person, canvasser, independent contractor, or solicitor operating in this state under the
authority of the retailer or its subsidiary for the purpose of selling, delivering, installing,
assembling, or the taking of orders for any tangible personal property.
CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 6203(a)-(b) (1996) (emphasis added).
176. Through a final regulation recently released, the State Board of Equalization has now direct-
ly addressed this issue. An out-of-state retailer is not "engaged in business" in California based solely
on its use of an unrelated representative or independent contractor that performs in-state warranty or
repair services with respect to tangible personal property sold by the retailer. Cal. Prop. Reg. Title 18,
§ 1684 (May 21, 1997) (enacted).
177. This is the reason California withdrew its support for BULLETIN 95-1. See supra note 8.
178. A retailer is "engaged in business" in Texas if, among other things, it "has a representative,
agent, salesman, canvasser, or solicitor operating in (Texas] under the authority of the retailer or its
subsidiary for the purpose of selling or delivering or the taking of orders for a taxable item." TEXAS
TAX CODE ANN. § 151.1 07(a)(2) (West 1996) (emphasis added).
179. See TEXAS TAX CODE ANN. § 151.103(a) (West 1996).
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instance, did this in 1996, although its new law refers to repair services
performed by an agent, as opposed to an independent contractor. 180
3. Some Adopting States May Have Conflicting Case Law
If the state auditing the business has signed on to Bulletin 95-1,
company personnel should do research to ensure that such adoption
does not contradict established state case law. For example, Arizona's
adoption of Bulletin 95-1 appears to be in conflict with its recent hold-
ing in Talbot's, Inc. v. Arizona Department of Revenue. 18 1 That case
involved a clothing retailer and mail order company that was building its
first retail store in Arizona. 182 The issue presented in the case concerned
whether Talbot's was required to collect use tax on its mail order sales in
Arizona during the period of time that the retail store was being
constructed.183 The Board of Tax Appeals held that no substantial nexus
existed between Talbot's and the state to require a use tax collection
duty, even though Talbot's had engaged an Arizona architect and
contractor to construct the retail store within the state.184
4. Establishing and Maintaining a Market is a Due Process
Theory
The primary Supreme Court cases relied upon by the MTC 185 stand
for Due Process nexus standards, not Commerce Clause standards.1 86
Therefore, they do not justify Bulletin 95-i's assertion that the fact
pattern necessarily creates a Commerce Clause substantial nexus. While
the Due Process rationale centers on whether the vendor has derived
some benefit from the state, the Commerce Clause rationale is based on
the protection of interstate commerce from undue state interference. 187
180. Added to the statutory list of businesses who are deemed to be "engaged in business" in
Kentucky is: "any retailer soliciting orders for tangible personal property from residents of this state
on a continuous, regular, systematic basis if the retailer benefits from an agent operating in this state
under the authority of the retailtr to repair or service tangible personal property sold by the retailer."
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 139.340(2)(e) (Michie 1996).




185. The MTC relied upon Scripto, Tyler Pipe, and Standard Pressed Steel. See supra notes 161 -
68 and accompanying text. For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 123-55 and accompanying
text.
186. In Scripto, for instance, the Court's analysis of the company and its sales personnel's
activities in Florida concerned the exploitation of Florida's market, the establishment of "some
minimum connection," and the sorts of links that make the imposition of a tax collection duty both
foreseeable and fair. All of these considerations are rooted in due process, as Quill reaffirmed.
COMMITTEE ON STATE T AX'N, COST Opposes MTC Nexus Bulletin 95-1, STATE TAX N OTES, March 25,
1996, 973, at 974-5.
187. Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 308-09 (1992).
710 [VOL. 73:685
SUBSTANTIAL NEXUS STANDARD
5. Only Continuous Local Solicitation by Third-Party
Representatives Creates Nexus
Bulletin 95-1 states that the Supreme Court has "uniformly held"
that the "provision of services" by an in-state representative creates a
nexus between the state and an out-of-state vendor. 188 Businesses should
challenge the auditor to come forth with any case that supports this bold
assertion. Not just any activity of an out-of-state vendor's in-state
representative will create a nexus for the company. Rather, the Supreme
Court has attributed a substantial nexus to an out-of-state vendor only
where the independent contractor has performed "continuous local
solicitation" in the taxing state. 189
In Scripto, because the third-party representatives were conducting
"continuous local solicitation" in Florida on behalf of the company, the
Court found the requisite nexus. 190 Critical to the Court's finding of
nexus was the "nature and extent of the activities" of the sales represen-
tatives. 191 The sole nature of their activities was the selling of goods; i.e.,
the "attracting, soliciting, and obtaining [of] Florida customers." 192
Accordingly, the Supreme Court, having acknowledged in Quill that
Scripto has been "the furthest extension of [a state's taxing] power"
under the Constitution,' 93 has made no suggestion whatsoever that
post-sale services by independent contractors could constitute a nexus.
Nor was any suggestion made in Tyler Pipe. Although the sales
representatives did "maintain and improve the name recognition, market
share, goodwill, and individual customer relations" of Tyler Pipe, this
was just an ancillary result of effective salesmanship by representatives
protecting the best interests of their client. 194 The same is true for the
"information regarding the Washington market" that the representatives
accumulated during the course of their sales activity and provided to
Tyler Pipe.195 The ancillary benefits derived by Tyler Pipe cannot
change the fact that the core "nature and extent" of the representatives'
activities was the selling of goods.
188. See BULLETIN 95-1, supra note 8, at 2.
189. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
190. Scripto Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 211 (1960).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 209.
193. Quill, 504 U.S. at 306.
194. Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington Dep't of Rev., 715 P.2d 123, 127 (1986).
195. Such information included: "product performance; competing products; pricing, market
conditions and trends; existing and upcoming construction projects; customer financial liability; and
other critical information of a local nature concerning Tyler Pipe's Washington market." Id.
1997]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:685
Furthermore, recent state cases and rulings involving nexus-creating
activities by independent contractors have all involved situations where
the representatives have been involved in the selling process. 196 Accord-
ingly, several other recent state opinions have found that a "substantial
nexus" was not established where the presence of employees in a state
was not sales-oriented. 197
6. Post-Sale Services Create Nexus Only When Performed by
Employees
Bulletin 95-1 indicates that a third-party representative can create a
nexus by doing something other than soliciting sales,198 but this is
misleading. The Supreme Court has never ruled that the actions of an
independent contractor, other than as a solicitor of sales, can create a
nexus for an out-of-state vendor. Standard Pressed Steel, which pro-
vided the basis for the MTC's assertion, involved the out-of-'state
196. See generally In re Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc., 920 P.2d 947 (Kan. 1996) (dealing with ele-
mentary school teachers acting as retailer's sales agents by soliciting book orders from students);
House of Lloyd v. Commonwealth of Pa., 684 A.2d 213 (Pa. 1996) (dealing with a vendor who
directed and controlled a very large sales force of home party hostesses dedicated exclusively to
promoting and selling its products); Carapace, Inc. v. Limbach, No. 90-R-825 (Ohio B.T.A., May 28,
1993) (dealing with a vendor who engaged a manufacturer's representative to encourage sales in the
state and to locate dealers willing to sell vendor's products); Consolidated Fuel Corp. v. Director of
Rev., RV-92-0230 (Mo. Admin. Hearing Comm., 1993) (dealing with a wholesale supplier of natural
gas who contracted with a Missouri corporation to solicit sales on its behalf in Missouri); Doctor's
Assocs., Inc. v. Director of Rev., RV-95-1748 (Mo. Admin. Hearing Comm., 1997) (dealing with
"development agents" who advertised and sold Subway franchises within the state); Texas Comp-
troller Hearing No. 34,113 (Dec. 19, 1995) (dealing with a manufacturer of playground equipment
who used Texas-based agents to solicit business and distribute its products in Texas); New York Dep't
of Tax'n & Finance, Advisory Opinion TSB-A-97(19)S (March 28, 1997) (dealing with a Canadian
mail-order company that used a New York mail forwarding service to collect catalog and merchan-
dise orders, then transported goods into New York in its own trucks); New York Dep't of Tax'n &
Finance, Advisory Opinion TSB-A-96(76)S (Dec. 13, 1996) (dealing with independent contractors
who made regular visits into New York to enroll people in a Florida company's training program).
Compare Scholastic Book Clubs v. Dep't of Treasury, 567 N.W.2d 692 (Mich. 1997) (holding that
teachers distributing book club catalogs to students and collecting order forms and payments for
out-of-state retailer did not create nexus).
197. See, e.g., In re NADA Services Corp., No. 810592, New York Div. of Tax Appeals (ALJ)
(Feb. 1, 1996) (involving employees who made 15 trips into the state to attend educational seminars
and five other miscellaneous visits); Virginia Dep't of Tax'n, Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 96-339
(Nov. 20, 1996) (dealing with an out-of-state vendor who sent employees into the state solely to install
and test custom software after a sale); Virginia Dep't of Tax'n, Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 97-276
(June 18, 1997) (regarding an out-of-state business specializing in the sale of high school and college
graduation photographs that sent employees into the state solely to shoot photographs of graduation
events); New York State Dep't of Tax'n and Finance, Opinion of Counsel, Doc. 96-27937 (Oct. 3,
1996) and West Virginia Dep't of Tax and Rev., TAA No. 96-003 (June 1996) (dealing with out-of-
state vendors who sent employees into the state to review and approve the production of promotional
materials).
198. The U.S. Supreme Court has uniformly found that the in-state presence of a representative
of an out-of-state seller who conducts regular or systematic activities in furtherance of the seller's
business, such as solicitation of sales or provision of services, creates nexus." See BULLETIN 95-1,
supra note 8, at 2 (emphasis added).
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vendor's employee who was stationed inside the taxing state. 199 Recent
state cases and rulings finding a nexus between out-of-state vendors
and the state based on post-sale services within the state have involved
services being performed by the vendor's own employees, not
independent contractors.
200
7. Actual Contact, Not Potential Contact, is the Test
Bulletin 95-1 asserts that the availability of an in-state warranty
repair service is enough to create a nexus, and whether any in-state
service is ever performed is of no constitutional consequence. 20 1 Busi-
nesses should argue, though, that mere potential to provide post-sale
repairs, without any actual repairs, is insufficient to establish a nexus.20 2
However, this argument should only be offered as a last resort, as the
company would be, in essence, admitting a nexus exists for those sales
that ultimately required an in-state visit from the third-party repair
company.
VI. THE SLIPPERY SLOPE RENDERS A WIDER APPLICATION
The arguments discussed in the prior section may also be used to
defend against nexus audits that may arise concerning other business
activities not contemplated in Bulletin 95-1. Many businesses fear that
Bulletin 95-1 has signified the advent of a slippery slope in which states
will continue to develop "attributable nexus" positions based on the
theory that somewhere along the line of business relationships there is a
physical presence in the state that can travel back up the chain of
199. See supra notes 125-36 and accompanying text.
200. See, e.g., In re Vermont Info. Processing, Inc. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal et al., 86 N.Y.2d
165 (1995), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3378 (1995) (dealing with employees of computer
software/hardware mail order vendors who visited New York customers to resolve problems and give
additional instructions in connection with the use of software programs); Texas Comptroller Hearing
No. 32,349 (Jan. 30, 1995) (dealing with employees of a computer hardware/software vendor who
entered the state to perform for each customer three post-sale training sessions of two to three days in
length); Philip Crosby Associates, Inc. v. Alabama Dep't of Revenue, No. U.96-143 (ALJ) (Dec. 4,
1996) (dealing with employees of a management consulting firm regularly and continuously traveled
into Alabama for post-sale consulting and on-site training). But see Wisconsin Dep't of Tax'n, Private
Letter Ruling No. W9728006 (April 18, 1997) (stating hypothetically that a software retailer with no
physical presence in the state "may have" use tax nexus if third-party representatives provided
warranty repair, training, installation, or certain other services in the state).
201. See BULLETIN 95-1, supra note 8. at 4.
202. When an out-of-state vendor handles a customer's problem exclusively over the telephone,
or where the vendor merely ships a repair part to the customer through the United States mail, this is
within the National Bellas Hess safe-harbor, according to Dan Bucks, Executive Director of the
Multistate Tax Commission. Advisory Board Discusses Nexus Developments, Effect of Federal
Actions, High Court Trends, and More at April 1996 Roundtable, CCH STATE T AX REVIEW (CCH State
Tax Advisory Board, Chicago Ill.) June 17, 1996, at 14 (comments by Dan Bucks, MTC Executive
Director).
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businesses to the seller. Several of these areas of concern are discussed
below.
A. SHIPMENTS OF GOODS BY CONTRACT CARRIER
An out-of-state vendor should consider the potentially damaging
effects of using a contract carrier, rather than a common carrier, to ship
goods into a state where it has no other physical presence. The MTC
distinguishes between a contract and common carrier by clearly indicat-
ing that deliveries to a customer into a state by common carrier 203 fall
within the safe harbor of contact afforded by Quill.204 However, the
MTC maintains that an out-of-state business making deliveries of goods
into a state via contract carrier does establish a physical presence
triggering a use tax collection responsibility. 205 This MTC position can
probably be circumvented, because in very few instances does a true
contract carrier deliver goods for a vendor. If a hauler holds itself out as
both a common and contract carrier, the law considers it a common
carrier. 206 Therefore, an out-of-state vendor using such a carrier would
be immune from any use tax collection liability pursuant to Quill.
Caution should still be exercised when shipping goods via common
carrier. At least one jurisdiction has recently held that shipments via
common carrier created a substantial nexus where the vendor had com-
plete control over the product during shipment, the contract's nature was
exclusive, the cargo was unique, and the contract terms were F.O.B.
destination. 207
B. TELECOMMUNICATIONS
An out-of-state vendor's relationship with independent contractors
performing telephone-related services in a state may subject the vendor
to a use tax collection responsibility in that state. Two recent Illinois
letter rulings illustrate this point. In one instance, the hiring of an
Illinois telephone marketing company to perform phone solicitation of
203. A common carrier "holds himself out to the public as engaged in business of transportation
of persons or property from place to place for compensation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 249 (5th ed.
1979).
204. MULTISTATE TAX COMMISSION, CONSTITUTIONAL NEXUS GUIDELINE FOR APPLICATION OF A
STATE'S SALES AND USE TAX TO AN OUT-OF-STATE BUSINESS (Initial Public Participation Working Group
Draft, March 1997) Section I1.C.5., Example 2, [hereinafter NEXUS GUIDELINE (3/97)].
205. Id.
206. A contract carrier is limited to those carriers "who operate under individual contracts and
who render a specialized service which is required by the peculiar needs of a particular shipper and
who do not come within the definition of common carriers." 86 CONG. REC. 11546 (daily ed. Sept. 5,
1940) (emphasis added).




customers all over the United States was a sufficient nexus between
Illinois and an out-of-state vendor, even though that vendor owned no
property in Illinois, maintained no office there, and had no other sales
representatives in the state.208 Hiring the Illinois telemarketer trans-
formed the out-of-state company into a "retailer maintaining a place of
business in Illinois."209
In another ruling, even though a Virginia-based retailer had no
office or traditional sales representatives present in Illinois, the Depart-
ment of Revenue ruled that it was "maintaining a place of business in
Illinois" due exclusively to its relationship with an Illinois answering
service. 210 Orders for the retailer's products were taken by telephone
through an "800" number, and some of the calls were routed to an
answering service located in Chicago.2 II Because the answering service
that took orders qualified as a representative operating in Illinois under
the vendor's authority, the vendor was required to collect Illinois use
taxes on sales to customers located in the state.212
An out-of-state business that maintains "local telecommunications
access" in a state is also in danger of acquiring a nexus to that state.
Suppose the business enters into an agreement with an interexchange
carrier, whereby the carrier, by contract with the telecommunications
company serving the local exchanges in the state, arranges for "trans-
parent switching" that achieves the out-of-state vendor's objective of
allowing in-state customers to contact it through a local telephone call.
Arguably, the interexchange carrier, acting on behalf of the out-of-state
vendor by providing local access, has created a "physical presence" in
the state for the out-of-state vendor. 213
C. HIRING IN-STATE PROFESSIONALS
Has a company established a nexus to a state merely by interviewing
or hiring an attorney in the state to represent it in litigation? Even the
MTC would probably decline to assert a nexus exists, given the Execu-
tive Director's contention that the "establishment and maintenance of a
market" is the key element of what gives rise to a nexus when a
company is represented by an independent contractor in a state.2 14
208. Illinois Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-0519 (December 29, 1995).
209. Id.
210. Illinois Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-0485 (November 1, 1995).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See NEXUS GUIDELINE (3/97), supra note 204, at Section II.C.8., Ex. 1.
214. See Advisory Board Discusses Nexus Developments, supra note 202, at 15; see also NEXUS
GUIDELINE (3/97), supra note 204, at Section Il.C.I., Ex. 4.
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Ordinarily, a company hires a particular law firm for personal
reasons; for instance, the company might believe that the law firm
employs the most reputable attorney in the country on the specific
subject matter at hand. Because this decision-making process does not
necessarily deal with the establishment and maintenance of a market in
the state where the attorney is located, a nexus most likely would not be
established.215
D. ADVERTISING
Assume a Missouri direct marketer hires an advertising company
located in New York. Does this mere fact establish a nexus between New
York and the Missouri vendor? Does this constitute physical presence in
New York? Probably not, because the advertising agency's location in
New York is not significantly associated with the ability of the Missouri
company to establish and maintain a market in New York vis-h-vis other
states.
Does the use of an in-state agency that creates promotional products
and services give rise to a nexus for an out-of-state vendor that has no
other physical contacts with the state? What if the vendor sends an
employee into the state to assist the agency with the production of the
materials? What if the vendor furnishes raw materials to the agency to be
used in producing the promotional items? The MTC contends that this
vendor has a "physical presence" in the state; 216 however, some states
have passed legislation directly contrary to the MTC position. 217
Can advertisement in the local media constitute a physical presence?
In Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland,2 18 the Supreme Court held that an
out-of-state company whose connections with a state were limited to
general advertising through newspaper, radio, and occasional direct
mailing, as well as deliveries into the state, did not even amount to a Due
Process nexus. 219 Although the Due Process Clause analysis in Miller
215. See also New York Dep't of Tax'n & Finance, Advisory Opinion, TSB-A-96(17)C, (July
24, 1996) (holding that meeting with prospective accountants, bankers, lawyers, or securities
underwriters in New York does not constitute doing business in the state).
216. See NExus GUIDELINE (3/97). supra note 204, at Section II.C.I., Ex. 1.
217. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-213(a)(20) (1996).
218. 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
219. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 341-45 (1954). Due process requires "some
definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it
seeks to tax." Id. at 344-45.
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Brothers has been overruled by Quill,220 advertising of this type is still
protected under the Commerce Clause.
Consistent with Miller Brothers, a California appellate court recently
held that a vendor did not establish a nexus where its only contact with
the state was through televised advertising. In JS&A Group Inc. v.
California Bd. of Equalization,22 1 the court ruled that a portion of the
California tax code subjecting out-of-state retailers to sales and use taxes
based solely upon contracts with local broadcasters or publishers, or
upon the solicitation of orders through in-state advertising, violated the
Commerce Clause and was invalid.2 22 Basing its decision on Quill, 223 the
court ruled that the airing of a commercial that promotes a product does
not convert a broadcaster or cable operator into an agent or sales
representative and, therefore, cannot alone give rise to the "physical
presence" required for a finding of nexus under the Commerce
Clause. 224
A few states, however, have expanded their definitions of nexus to
capture out-of-state vendors whose sole presence in the state is through a
representative that provides advertising services. For example, in 1996
the Massachusetts Department of Revenue announced its intent to pro-
spectively enforce a dormant nexus statute enacted in 1988 that defines
"engaged in business" to include "exploiting the retail sales market in
the commonwealth through any means whatsoever," such as advertising
or soliciting in newspapers, magazines, radio or television broadcasts,
computer networks, or in any other communications medium." 22 5
Could nexus be established merely by advertising on the Internet?
Courts have split on this issue. However, to date, litigation involving this
issue has been limited to civil procedure disputes, in which the presence
of a nexus has been examined only from a Due Process perspective. 226
220. Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992).
In 'modem commercial life' it matters little that such solicitation is accomplished by a
deluge of catalogs rather than a phalanx of drummers: the requirements of due process
are met irrespective of a corporation's lack of physical presence in the taxing State.
Thus, to the extent that our decisions have indicated that the Due Process Clause requires
physical presence in a State for the imposition of duty to collect a use tax, we overrule
those holdings as superseded by developments in the law of due process.
Id. at 308.
221. No. 969816 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 1997).
222. JS&A Group Inc. v. California Bd. of Equalization, No. 969816, slip op. at 5 (Cal. Ct. App.
Feb. 10, 1997).
223. The JS&A court declared: "We can find no qualitative difference between the methods of
solicitation in Quill and advertisement on broadcast and cable television." Id. at 5.
224. Id.
225. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 64H, § I (West 1996); MASSACHUSETrS DEP'T OF REV.,
TECHNICAL INFO. RELEASE 96-8 (Oct. 16, 1996).
226. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). The limitations of the
Due Process clause require that a nonresident corporate defendant have "minimum contacts" with the
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A recent non-tax, federal court of appeals decision is on point. In Ben-
susan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 227 the plaintiff commenced a trademark
protection action against King, a Missouri resident who had established a
home page for his jazz club on the World Wide Web.228 The server for
the web page was not located in New York. 229 The defendant's motion
to dismiss was granted because the mere establishment of a web site was
insufficient to permit the court to find that King had purposefully
directed activities into the New York market. 230 In other words, a Due
Process nexus did not exist.231
Other federal district court cases, such as Inset Systems, Inc. v.
Instruction Set, Inc.,232 have held that vendors who use the Internet to
attempt to conduct business within a state have, in fact, established the
minimum contacts necessary to comport with Due Process. 233 Yet, it is
unknown how these courts would rule on the same set of facts in terms
of whether this level of contact would exceed Commerce Clause nexus.
As evidenced by its recently issued regulation, the California State
Board of Equalization (SBE) either agrees with Bensusan or, if not, main-
tains that advertising on the Internet does not amount to "substantial
nexus" under the Commerce Clause. According to the SBE, a retailer
would not be "engaged in business" in California if its sole contact with
the state is the use of a computer server on the Internet to create or main-
tain a World Wide Web page or site. The regulation makes clear that no
Internet service provider (ISP) or similar provider shall be considered an
agent or representative of an out-of-state vendor using its services,
regardless of the server's physical location.234
forum state such that it would reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. Id. at 297. The
essence of the "minimum contacts" test is whether a company has "purposefully avail[ed] itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of
its laws." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
227. 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
228. Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 127 F.3d
35 (2d Cir. 1997).
229. Id. at 297.
230. See id. at 301.
231. Id. at 297. The court noted that "[c]reating a site, like placing a product into the stream of
commerce, may be felt nationwide-or even worldwide-but, without more, it is not an act purpose-
fully directed toward the forum state." Id. at 301; see also McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, Inc., 40
U.S.P.Q.2d 1826 (S.D. Cal. 1996); Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(holding a lack of personal jurisdiction where defendant's only contact with a state was that residents
of the state had access to defendant's web site).
232. 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996).
233. See Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1338 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Zippo Mfg. Co. v.
Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).




There are an infinite number of complex sales and use tax issues
arising out of the electronic commerce industry, a small sample of which
is contained in this subsection.235 It is foreseeable that states will attempt
to retain jurisdiction over out-of-state Internet "on-line" vendors by
attributing the in-state physical presence of other parties (as "agents")
to these vendors. For example, in a typical transaction, an ISP enters into
a business agreement with a telecommunications provider (e.g., AT&T)
that owns telephone equipment in a state. Delivery of the ISP's service is
impossible, of course, without the telecommunications mechanism. An
Internet vendor then enters into an agreement with the ISP to link its web
page onto a host computer (the use of which the ISP will license). 236
The MTC might assert that the on-line vendor has a physical
presence in the state in which the host computer is located. 237 There are
several problems with this position: (1) a vendor's decision concerning
where to place the host computer has nothing to do with establishing and
maintaining a market in the state of choice; (2) ISPs and on-line vendors
often do not know where the server they are using is located; and (3)
when they find out where it is located, they can easily move it to a
"tax-haven" state (e.g., Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, or
Oregon) or out of the United States altogether.238 Some states have even
suggested that AT&T's nexus, arising from the physical presence of its
equipment in a state, flows through to the on-line vendor, bestowing on it
a use tax collection duty wherever AT&T has a nexus.239
While there are currently no cases applying Quill's safe harbor to
on-line vendors, it appears that Quill's rationale would apply just the
same. There seems to be no cause for a legal distinction between
ordering a product via a computer and ordering the same product over
235. For more information, see two White Papers on state and local Internet and on-line taxation
recently released by the Treasury Department: Logging on to Cyberspace Tax Policy, and Straight
Talk: Internet. Tax and Interstate Commerce. Interactive Service Association, Logging on to Cyber-
space Tax Policy (visited Jan. 8, 1998) <http://www.isa.net/about/releases/taxwhpap.html>; Infor-
mation Technology Association of America, Straight Talk: Internet, Tax and Interstate Commerce
(visited Jan. 8, 1998) <http://www.ita.org>.
236. In a typical on-line sale, a potential customer who is "surfing the Net" enters a vendor's
"home page," which resides in a server and is that vendor's presence on the Internet.
237. MULTISTATE TAX COMM'N, CONsTrTIONAL NEXUS GUIDELINE FOR APPLICATION OF A STATE'S
SALES AND USE TAX TO AN OUT-OF-STATE BUSINESS (Preliminary Staff Working Draft, Jan. 1996),
Section I[.C.5., Example I. Note that this principle was temporarily deferred from subsequent drafts
of the guidelines (Nov. 1996 and March 1997), because the MTC hopes to reach a consensus as soon
as possible on the remainder of the draft without having to address this controversial issue.
238. Information Technology Association of America, Straight Talk: Internet, Tax and Interstate
Commerce (visited Jan. 8, 1998) <http://www.ita.org>.
239. Id.
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the telephone or through the mail. When using the mail for making
orders and deliveries, a vendor is not considered to have entered into an
agency relationship with the United States Postal Service and, therefore,
does not establish nexus in every state as a result of this relationship.
Products ordered or delivered via a different medium, such as the
Internet, should render the same result. 240
Other than its use of telephone lines, the Internet does not create
any physical presence by sellers in a taxing state. Without question, it
creates less of a physical presence than that generated by out-of-state
mail-order companies that physically send their materials into a state.
VII. CONCLUSION
Several decades ago, it appeared that the Supreme Court wanted to
exempt all interstate commerce from state taxation. 24 1 In the 1930s, this
philosophy was abandoned when the Court upheld the constitutionality
of use taxes in Henneford.242 Over the years, the Court has given states
broader authority to recover use taxes from out-of-state vendors, and this
discretionary posture was refined in Quill. Today, one of the few
remaining protections for businesses from interstate taxation is the
Commerce Clause limitation placed on a state's ability to mandate the
collection of use taxes by out-of-state vendors.
In an effort to tax telephone, mail-order, and Internet sales, states
are moving to expand the concept of substantial nexus to encompass
many contacts within a state that appear to be constitutionally insignifi-
cant. Bulletin 95-1 is a primary example of the states' expansive efforts
to tax interstate sales. Although it purports to be based on current
constitutional standards, Bulletin 95-1 exceeds the current jurisprudence
on Commerce Clause nexus found in Quill and related cases.
Nonetheless, facing increasing pressures to derive additional reve-
nues from new sources, state departments of revenue will continue their
audit efforts through the implementation of Bulletin 95-1 type theory.
Accordingly, businesses must become better acquainted with areas of
exposure that have not traditionally caused much concern. When a sales
and use tax nexus audit inevitably occurs, advanced preparation con-
cerning the company's constitutional protections will be a key factor in
reducing or eliminating potential assessments.
240. Id.
241. See generally Sonnebom Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506, 507-21 (1923); Robbins v. Shelby
County Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 490-99 (1887).
242. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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